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Abstract
Order-revealing encryption is a useful cryptographic primitive that provides range queries on en-
crypted data since anyone can compare the order of plaintexts by running a public comparison algorithm.
Most studies on order-revealing encryption focus only on comparing ciphertexts generated by a single
client, and there is no study on comparing ciphertexts generated by multiple clients. In this paper, we
propose the concept of multi-client order-revealing encryption that supports comparisons not only on
ciphertexts generated by one client but also on ciphertexts generated by multiple clients. We also define
a simulation-based security model for multi-client order-revealing encryption. The security model is
defined with respect to the leakage function which quantifies how much information is leaked from the
scheme. Next, we present two specific multi-client order-revealing encryption schemes with different
leakage functions in bilinear maps and prove their security in the random oracle model. Finally, we
give the implementation of the proposed schemes and suggest methods to improve the performance of
ciphertext comparisons.
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1 Introduction
Today, a large amount of the users’ data is collected and stored in cloud servers to provide various services
utilizing this personal data. Recently, as the concern of privacy issues in personal data has increased, it has
been an important issue to safely store personal data in a cloud server and to prevent it from being leaked.
The simplest way to solve this issue is to perform data encryption. However, it is difficult for the cloud
server to provide ordinary services such as keyword searches, range queries, and numeric operations on
encrypted data since plaintexts are transformed to random ciphertexts. In order to overcome this problem,
advanced encryption schemes that support computation on encrypted data such as homomorphic encryption
and functional encryption have been actively studied [8, 9]. However, it is difficult to provide efficient
services using them since these schemes are somewhat inefficient.
One way to allow efficient computation on encrypted data while providing privacy of user data is to
consider an efficient encryption scheme that allows only a limited operation such as a search or range
query. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) is a kind of symmetric-key encryption that supports keyword
searching on encrypted data [19]. Order-preserving encryption (OPE) and order-revealing encryption (ORE)
are special kinds of symmetric-key encryption that can be used for efficient range queries over encrypted
data by comparing ciphertexts without decrypting these ciphertexts. An OPE scheme is a deterministic
encryption scheme, which encrypts plaintexts in numeric values to generate ciphertexts in numerical values
by maintaining the order of plaintexts, so that the order of plaintexts can be compared by simply comparing
the order of ciphertexts [1–3]. An ORE scheme is a probabilistic encryption scheme having ciphertexts of
arbitrary values, and the order of plaintexts can be compared by running a public comparison algorithm on
ciphertexts [4–6, 13]. The first ORE scheme of Boneh et al. [4] provides the best possible security, but it is
inefficient since it uses heavy cryptographic tools such as multi-linear maps. Recently, several practical ORE
schemes have been proposed but these schemes inevitably leak some information on plaintexts in addition
to the comparison result [5, 6, 13].
All of the previous ORE studies only considered to compare ciphertexts generated by a single client.
However, in a real environment, it is necessary to compare ciphertexts generated by multiple clients if
these clients handle related plaintexts. For example, we consider a scenario where students are divided
into multiple classes to take lectures taught by different instructors. In this case, the grades of each class
are encrypted by the encryption key of each instructor, but if necessary, the grades of these different classes
should be comparable without decryption. As another example, we can consider a scenario in which patients
are treated by different physicians in a hospital and their medical data are encrypted and stored with the
secret keys of physicians. In this case, a physician may want to compare the medical data of patients that
he or she has treated with the medical data of other patients that have been treated by other physicians
for medical research purposes. To support these scenarios, a comparison key must be provided that can
compare the encrypted data generated by multiple clients and this comparison key should be provided only
to an authorized user. We call the ORE scheme that supports comparison operations not only on ciphertexts
generated by one client but also on ciphertexts generated by different clients, as the multi-client order-
revealing encryption (MC-ORE) scheme.
We note that an MC-ORE scheme can be easily derived from a multi-input functional encryption (MI-
FE) scheme [10]. That is, if each ciphertext slot of an MI-FE scheme is related to the client index of an
MC-ORE scheme and an MI-FE private key for the comparison function on two ciphertexts is provided as
an MC-ORE comparison key, then we can build an MC-ORE scheme from an MI-FE scheme. However,
this approach is not practical because an MI-FE scheme for general functions requires heavy cryptographic
tools such as multi-linear maps or indistinguishable obfuscation.
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1.1 Our Results
We summarize the contributions of this paper which include the notion of MC-ORE and two practical MC-
ORE schemes with limited leakage in bilinear maps.
Definition. We first introduce the notion of MC-ORE by extending the concept of ORE [4] to additionally
support the comparison operation on ciphertexts which are generated by multiple clients. In an MC-ORE
scheme, each client creates ciphertexts by encrypting plaintexts with his/her secret key and anyone can
publicly compare the order of two ciphertexts generated by a single client similar to the functionality of
ORE. In addition to this basic functionality, it supports the comparison operation of two ciphertexts created
by different clients if an additional comparison key for two clients is given. Note that the comparison of
two ciphertexts generated from different clients is not a public operation since a comparison key given from
a trusted center is needed to prevent the leakage resulting from these comparisons. To define the security
model of MC-ORE, we follow the security model of ORE that allows the leakage [6]. In this work, we give
a simulation-based security model for MC-ORE with a leakage function L. Informally, this definition states
that if an adversary can obtain information from ciphertexts of clients’ plaintexts ( j1,m1), . . . ,( jq,mq) where
jk is the index of a client, then it can be inferred from L(( j1,m1), . . . ,( jq,mq)). One difference between our
security model and that of ORE with the leakage is that the adversary can query many comparison keys for
different clients. To handle this comparison key query, we define the static security model which requires
that the adversary should first specify a set of corrupted client indices.
Basic Construction. Next we propose two realizable MC-ORE schemes with different leakage functions.
Our first MC-ORE scheme conceptually follows the design principle of the ORE scheme of Chenette et
al. [6] that encrypts each bit of a plaintext by using a pseudo-random function (PRF) that takes a prefix of
the plaintext as an input. However, it is not easy to extend an ORE scheme that uses a PRF to an MC-ORE
scheme that supports the comparison operation for different clients since the outputs of PRF with different
client’s keys are random values. To solve this difficulty, we use an algebraic PRF in bilinear groups which
is defined as PRFs(x) = H(x)
s where H is a hash function and s is a PRF key [14]. Suppose there is a single
client and the client creates ciphertexts C = (H(x)s,H(x+ 1)s) and C′ = (H(x′)s,H(x′+ 1)s) for plaintexts
x and x′ in binary values by using a secret key s. A user can publicly check whether x+ 1 = x′ or not
by comparing H(x+ 1)s = H(x′)s from two ciphertexts. Now suppose there are two clients with different
secret keys s and s′ and clients create ciphertexts C = (H(x)s,H(x+1)s) and C′ = (H(x′)s
′
,H(x′+1)s
′
) for
plaintexts x and x′ in binary values respectively. To compare two ciphertexts generated by different clients,
a user first receives a comparison key CK = (gˆrs, gˆrs
′
) from a trusted center and checks whether x+ 1 = x′
or not by comparing e(H(x+1)s, gˆrs
′
) = e(H(x′)s
′
, gˆrs). To extend the comparison of binary values to large
values, we modify the encoding method of Chenette et al. [6] that uses the prefixes of a plaintext. Let
m = x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n be a plaintext. For each i ∈ [n], the encryption algorithm encodes two strings
Ei,0 = x1x2 · · ·xi−1‖0xi and Ei,1 = x1x2 · · ·xi−1‖(0xi + 1) and evaluates Ci,0 = H(Ei,0)
s and Ci,1 = H(Ei,1)
s.
For example, the third bit of m= 101 is encoded as E3,0 = 10‖01= 1001 and E3,1 = 10‖(01+1) = 10‖10=
1010. The ciphertext is formed as CT = ({Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]). Note that we have m < m
′ if there is the smallest
index i∗ such that the prefixes of two plaintexts with i∗−1 length are equal and xi∗ +1= x
′
i∗ . We prove the
security of our first MC-ORE scheme in the simulation-based (SIM) security model with a leakage function
that reveals the comparison result as well as the most significant differing bit.
Enhanced Construction. Our second MC-ORE scheme is the enhanced version of the first MC-ORE
scheme that reduces the leakage due to the comparison of ciphertexts generated by a single client. In our
first scheme, a ciphertext was simultaneously used for two purposes: ciphertext comparisons in a single
client and ciphertext comparisons between different clients. In the second scheme, we divide the ciphertext
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into two parts and treat each ciphertext part differently. That is, the first ciphertext part is only used for
ciphertext comparisons in a single client, and the second ciphertext part is only used for ciphertext com-
parisons between different clients. For the first ciphertext part, we can use any ORE scheme that has the
reduced leakage [5, 13]. For the second ciphertext part, we construct an encrypted ORE (EORE) scheme
by modifying our first MC-ORE scheme. In the EORE scheme, an (encrypted) ciphertext is created by first
generating a ciphertext of the first MC-ORE scheme and then encrypting it with a public-key encryption
scheme. Unlike the first MC-ORE scheme, this EORE scheme does not allow ciphertext comparisons in a
single client since ciphertexts are securely encrypted. However, it allows ciphertext comparisons between
different clients since it can derive the original ciphertexts of the first MC-ORE scheme if a comparison key
is provided by the trusted center. Therefore, there is no leakage from the second ciphertext part and the
leakage only depends on the first ciphertext part if comparison keys are not exposed. We prove the SIM
security of our second MC-ORE scheme under the external Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Implementation. Finally, we implement our MC-ORE schemes and evaluate the performance of each al-
gorithm. The proposed MC-ORE scheme provides single-client comparison and multi-client comparison
algorithms. In the MC-ORE scheme, the most computationally expensive algorithm is the multi-client com-
parison algorithm since it requires two pairing operations per each bit comparison until the most significant
differing bit (MSDB) is found. To improve this multi-client comparison, we present other comparison
methods and compare the performance of these suggested methods. The first method is a simple method
that performs the comparison sequentially from the ciphertext element of the most significant bit to that of
the least significant bit. It is efficient when the MSDB exists in the higher bits, but it is inefficient when
the MSDB exists in the lower bits. The second method is a binary search method that uses a binary search
instead of a sequential search to find the MSDB location. This method performs approximately logn compu-
tations to find the MSDB location where n is the length of a plaintext. The third method is a hybrid method
that combines multi-client comparisons and single-client comparisons. This method can improve the perfor-
mance of ciphertext comparisons between multiple ciphertexts by performing one multi-client comparison
and many single-client comparisons.
1.2 Related Work
Order-Preserving Encryption. The concept of OPE was introduced by Agrawal et al. [1] in the database
community, and this is a symmetric-key encryption scheme that supports efficient comparison operations
on ciphertexts since the order of plaintexts is maintained in ciphertexts. The security model of OPE was
presented by Boldyreva et al. [2], and it is called indistinguishability under ordered chosen plaintext attack
(IND-OCPA). The security notion of IND-OCPA says that an adversary can not obtain any information from
ciphertexts except the order of underlying plaintexts. However, the ciphertext space of OPE is required to be
extremely large to satisfy this IND-OCPA security. To achieve this IND-OCPA security, several variants of
OPE such as mutable OPE have been proposed, but most of them are inefficient since they require stateful
encryption and an interactive protocol [12, 17, 18].
Order-Revealing Encryption. Boneh et al. [4] introduced the notion of ORE which is a generalization
of OPE where the order of plaintexts can be publicly compared by running a comparison algorithm on
ciphertexts. They also proposed a specific ORE scheme that achieves the IND-OCPA security by using
multi-linear maps, but this scheme is quite impractical. Chenette et al. [6] constructed the first practical
ORE scheme by encrypting each bit of messages using pseudo-random functions. They showed that their
scheme achieve a weaker security model of ORE that reveals additional information of underlying plaintexts
in addition to the order of plaintexts. After the work of Chenette et al., many ORE schemes were proposed to
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reduce the additional leakage. Lewi et al. [13] constructed an IND-OCPA secure ORE scheme only for small
plaintext spaces by decomposing the encryption algorithm into two separate functions, left encryption and
right encryption where the right encryption achieves the IND-OCPA security. Cash et al. [5] constructed an
ORE scheme with reduced leakage by using property-preserving hash functions in bilinear maps. Although
this ORE scheme achieves to reduce the leakage, it is inefficient due to the larger size of ciphertexts and the
pairing operation.
Attacks on ORE. Naveed et al. [16] explored inference attacks on encrypted database columns to recover
messages against ORE-encrypted databases. These attacks usually use the order and frequency of plaintexts
and auxiliary information such as plaintext distribution. Durak et al. [7] and Grubbs et al. [11] proposed
improved inference attacks of Naveed et al. in several ways and additionally presented leakage-abuse attacks
against ORE schemes with the specified leakage. Both attacks showed that the leakage of ORE can be
effectively used to recover more accurate plaintexts than that was theoretically analyzed.
2 Multi-Client Order-Revealing Encryption
In this section, we define the syntax and the security model of multi-client order-revealing encryption by
extending those of order-revealing encryption.
2.1 Notation
Let [n] be the set of {1, . . . ,n} and [k,n] be the set of {k, . . . ,n}. Let cmp(m,m′) be a comparison function
that returns 1 if m < m′ and returns 0, otherwise. Let ind(m,m′) be an index function that returns the index
of the most significant differing bit between plaintexts m and m′ of n-bits and returns n+ 1 if m = m′. Let
prefix(m, i) be a prefix function that takes as input a plaintext m = x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n and an index i and
returns x1x2 · · ·xi−1 as the prefix of xi.
2.2 Order-Revealing Encryption
Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a special kind of symmetric-key encryption that supports a comparison
operation on encrypted data by using a public procedure [4]. In ORE, a client creates ciphertexts of plaintexts
by using his/her secret key SK and uploads these ciphertexts to a remote database. After that, anyone can
compare the order of two ciphertexts CT andCT ′ by using a public comparison algorithm. The following is
the syntax of ORE given by Chenette et al. [6].
Definition 2.1 (ORE). An ORE scheme consists of three algorithms, Setup, Encrypt, Compare which are
defined over a well-ordered domain D as follows:
Setup(1λ ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a secret key SK.
Encrypt(m,SK). The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m ∈ D and the secret key SK and
outputs a ciphertext CT .
Compare(CT,CT ′). The comparison algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts CT and CT ′ and outputs a
comparison bit b ∈ {0,1}.
The correctness of ORE is defined as follows: For all SK generated by Setup and any CT,CT ′ generated by
Encrypt on plaintexts m,m′, it is required that Compare(CT,CT ′) = cmp(m,m′).
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The best possible security of ORE, which is IND-OCPA,was defined by Boneh et al. [4]. The simulation-
based security of ORE with additional leakage L was defined by Chenette et al. [6].
2.3 Multi-Client Order-Revealing Encryption
Multi-client order-revealing encryption (MC-ORE) is an extension of ORE that supports comparison oper-
ations not only between ciphertexts generated by a single client but also between ciphertexts generated by
different clients. In MC-ORE, each client of an index j creates ciphertexts of plaintexts by using his/her
secret key SK j which is given by a trusted center. Anyone can compare two ciphertexts CTj and CT
′
j gener-
ated by the single client by using a public comparison algorithm as the same as in ORE. In addition, a client
can compare two ciphertexts CTj and CT
′
k generated by different clients with different indices j and k if the
client obtains a comparison key CK j,k from the trusted center. The syntax of MC-ORE is given as follows.
Definition 2.2 (MC-ORE). An MC-ORE scheme consists of six algorithms, Setup, GenKey, Encrypt, Com-
pare, GenCmpKey, and CompareMC, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ,N). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and the number of clients N ∈ N
and outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
GenKey( j,MK,PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input a client index j ∈ [N], the master key MK,
and the public parameters PP. It outputs a secret key SK j for the client index j.
Encrypt(m,SK j,PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m ∈ D, the secret key SK j, and
the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CTj.
Compare(CTj,CT
′
j ,PP). The comparison algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts CTj,CT
′
j of the same
client index j and the public parameters PP. It outputs a comparison bit b ∈ {0,1}.
GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP). The comparison key generation algorithm takes as input two client indices
j,k, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a comparison key CK j,k for two
clients.
CompareMC(CTj,CT
′
k ,CK j,k,PP). The multi-client comparison algorithm takes as input two ciphertexts
CTj,CT
′
k of two client indices j,k, the comparison key CK j,k, and the public parameters PP. It outputs
a comparison bit b ∈ {0,1}.
The correctness of MC-ORE is defined as follows: For all PP,MK,{SK j} j∈[N] generated by Setup and
GenKey, any CK j,k generated by GenCmpKey, and any CTj,CT
′
j ,CT
′′
k generated by Encrypt on plaintexts
m,m′,m′′, it is required that:
Compare(CTj,CT
′
j ,PP) = cmp(m,m
′) and
CompareMC(CTj,CT
′′
k ,CK j,k,PP) = cmp(m,m
′′).
The simulation-based security (SIM-security) model of MC-ORE is defined with a leakage function
which enables quantifying any information inevitably leaked from the scheme. Since the leakage is affected
by whether comparison keys are exposed, the leakage function LS is defined with respect to a set S of the
revealed comparison keys. In the real experiment, an adversary can access a comparison key generation
oracle to obtain any comparison key as well as an encryption oracle to obtain any ciphertext of its choice
( ji,mi) where ji is the client index corresponding to the i-th message mi. Eventually, the adversary outputs
6
the deducing result from the given information. In the ideal experiment, the adversary also can obtain
any comparison key and any ciphertext, but all values are generated by the simulator which has only the
information derived from the leakage function LS(( j1,m1), . . . ,( jq,mq)). The security is proved by showing
the outputs of two distributions are indistinguishable.
However, the leakage function is influenced by the order of ciphertext queries and comparison key
queries. When ( j1,m1) and ( j2,m2) are queried to the encryption oracle, the simulator generates ciphertexts
CTj1 and CTj2 with no leakage if the comparison key CK j1, j2 was not exposed. After that, if the adversary
requests CK j1, j2 causing the leakage LS(( j1,m1),( j2,m2)), it can identify that there is something wrong in
the simulation of CTj1 and CTj2 . That is, the simulator should have generated the ciphertexts by predicting
the leakage but it is difficult to simulate with such a flexible leakage function. In addition, when CK j1, j3
andCK j2, j3 are exposed, the simulator generates CTj1 andCTj2 with no leakage sinceCK j1, j2 is not exposed.
After that, if ( j3,m3) is queried to the encryption oracle, the simulator generates CTj3 with the leakage
LS(( j1,m3),( j2,m3)). Again, the adversary can notice that the simulation of CTj1 and CTj2 is wrong. Thus,
we define the static version of the SIM-security model in which a set S of revealed comparison keys and the
ciphertext queries are initially fixed. The static SIM-security model of MC-ORE with the leakage function
LS is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Static SIM-Security with Leakage). For a security parameter λ , let A be an adversary
and B be a simulator. Let S= {( j,k)} j,k∈[N] be a set of index tuples where CK j,k is revealed and let LS(·) be
a leakage function. The experiments of REALMC-OREA (λ ) and SIM
MC-ORE
A,B,L (λ ) are defined as follows:
REAL
MC-ORE
A (λ )
1.
(
stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))
)
←A(1λ )
2. (PP,MK)← Setup(1λ ,N)
3. CK j,k ←GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP), ∀( j,k) ∈ S
4. for 1≤ i≤ q,
CTji ← Encrypt(mi,SK ji ,PP)
5. Output (CTj1 , · · · ,CTjq) and stA
SIM
MC-ORE
A,B,L (λ )
1.
(
stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))
)
←A(1λ )
2. (stB,PP)←B(1
λ ,N)
3. CK j,k ←B(stB), ∀( j,k) ∈ S
4. for 1≤ i≤ q,(
stB,CTji
)
←B
(
stB,LS(( j1,m1), · · · ,( ji,mi))
)
5. Output (CTj1 , · · · ,CTjq) and stA
We say that an MC-ORE scheme is ST-SIM secure if for all polynomial-size adversaries A, there ex-
ists a polynomial-size simulator B such that the outputs of the two distributions REALMC-OREA (λ ) and
SIM
MC-ORE
A,B,L (λ ) are indistinguishable.
Remark 2.4. For S = {( j,k)} j,k∈[N] of index tuples where the comparison key CK j,k is revealed, let LS be
the following leakage function:
LS
(
( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)
)
=
{
cmp(mi′ ,mi) : 1≤ i
′ < i≤ q, ji′ = ji or ( ji′ , ji) ∈ S
}
.
If an MC-ORE scheme is secure with leakage LS, then it is IND-OCPA secure.
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3 Basic MC-ORE Construction
In this section, we propose our first construction of MC-ORE with leakage and prove the ST-SIM security
of our scheme.
3.1 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
Let Gas be a group generator algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a tuple
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) where p is a random prime and G,Gˆ, and GT be three cyclic groups of prime order p.
Let g and gˆ be generators of G and Gˆ, respectively. The bilinear map e : G× Gˆ→ GT has the following
properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈G,∀vˆ ∈ Gˆ and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(u
a, vˆb) = e(u, vˆ)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g ∈G, gˆ ∈ Gˆ such that e(g, gˆ) has order p in GT .
We say that G,Gˆ,GT are asymmetric bilinear groups if the group operations in G,Gˆ, and GT as well as the
bilinear map e are all efficiently computable, but there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between
G and Gˆ.
Assumption 3.1 (External Diffie-Hellman, XDH). Let (p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) be a tuple randomly generated by
Gas(1
λ ) where p is a prime order of the groups. Let g, gˆ be random generators of groups G,Gˆ, respectively.
The XDH assumption is that the decisional Diffie-Hellman(DDH) assumption holds in G. That is, if the
challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,g
a,gb
)
and T
are given, no PPT algorithm A can distinguish T = T0 = g
ab from T = T1 = g
c with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of A is defined as AdvXDHA (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 0]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where
the probability is taken over random choices of a,b,c ∈ Zp.
3.2 Construction
Before we present our basic MC-ORE scheme, we first define a leakage function for our scheme. Let N ∈N
be the maximum number of clients and S= {( j,k)} j,k∈[N] be a set of client index tuples where a comparison
key CK j,k is revealed. A leakage function LS is defined as follows:
LS
(
( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)
)
=
{
cmp(mi′ ,mi), ind(mi′ ,mi) : 1≤ i
′ < i≤ q, ji′ = ji or ( ji′ , ji) ∈ S
}
.
If S= /0, then LS becomes equal to the leakage function L defined by Chenette et al. [6]. Otherwise, i.e.
if S 6= /0, some comparison keys are revealed and it causes increased leakage. Our basic MC-ORE scheme
is described as follows:
MC-ORE.Setup(1λ ,N). This algorithm first generates bilinear groups G,Gˆ,GT of prime order p with
group generators g ∈ G and gˆ ∈ Gˆ. It chooses a random exponent s j ∈ Zp for all j ∈ [N] and
outputs a master key MK = {s j} j∈[N] and public parameters PP = ((p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,H) where
H : {0,1}∗ →G is a full-domain hash function.
MC-ORE.GenKey( j,MK,PP). Let MK = {s1, · · · ,sN}. It outputs a secret key SK j = s j.
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MC-ORE.Encrypt(m,SK j,PP). Let m = x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n and SK j = s j. For each i ∈ [n], it computes
Ci,0 = H(prefix(m, i)‖0xi)
s j and Ci,1 = H(prefix(m, i)‖(0xi + 1))
s j where ‖ is the concatenation of
two bit strings. It outputs a ciphertext CTj =
(
{Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]
)
.
MC-ORE.Compare(CTj,CT
′
j ,PP). For the same client index j, let CTj = ({Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]) and CT
′
j =
({C′i,0,C
′
i,1}i∈[n]). It first finds the smallest index i
∗ such that Ci∗,0 6= C
′
i∗,0 by sequentially compar-
ingCi,0 andC
′
i,0. If such index i
∗ exists andCi∗,1 =C
′
i∗,0 holds, then it outputs 1. If such index i
∗ exists
and Ci∗,0 =C
′
i∗,1, then it outputs 0. If no such index i
∗ exists, then it outputs 0.
MC-ORE.GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP). Let s j and sk be the secret keys of client indices j and k. It chooses
a random exponent r ∈ Zp and computes K0 = gˆ
rs j ,K1 = gˆ
rsk . It outputs a comparison key CK j,k =
(K0,K1).
MC-ORE.CompareMC(CTj,CT
′
k ,CK j,k,PP). LetCTj = ({Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]) andCT
′
k = ({C
′
i,0,C
′
i,1}i∈[n]). Let
CK j,k = (K0,K1). It first finds the smallest index i
∗ such that e(Ci∗,0,K1) 6= e(C
′
i∗,0,K0) by sequentially
comparing e(Ci,0,K1) and e(C
′
i,0,K0). If such index i
∗ exists and e(Ci∗,1,K1) = e(C
′
i∗,0,K0) holds, then
it outputs 1. If such index i∗ exists and e(Ci∗,0,K1) = e(C
′
i∗,1,K0), then it outputs 0. If no such index i
∗
exists, then it outputs 0.
3.3 Correctness
To show the correctness of the above scheme, we define encoding functions E0,E1 that take (i,m) as input
and output the encoded i-th bit of m= x1 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n as follows:
E0(i,m) = prefix(m, i)‖0xi, E1(i,m) = prefix(m, i)‖(0xi+1).
The encoding functions satisfy the following conditions. If m=m′, E0(i,m) = E0(i,m
′) holds for all i ∈ [n].
If m < m′ and i∗ is the smallest index such that xi∗ 6= x
′
i∗ , then E0(i,m) = E0(i,m
′) holds for all i < i∗ and
E0(i,m) 6= E0(i,m
′) holds for all i≥ i∗, and especially, E1(i
∗,m) = E0(i
∗,m′) holds.
Let SK j = s j be the secret key of a client index j andCTj = ({Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]) andCT
′
j = ({C
′
i,0,C
′
i,1}i∈[n]) be
ciphertexts on messages m= x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n and m′ = x′1x
′
2 · · ·x
′
n ∈ {0,1}
n. If m<m′, there must be the
smallest index i∗ such that xi = x
′
i for all i< i
∗ and xi∗ 6= x
′
i∗ . Thus, we have that
Ci,0 = H(E0(i,m))
s j = H(E0(i,m
′))s j =C′i,0 ∀i< i
∗ and
Ci∗,1 = H(E1(i
∗,m))s j =H(E0(i
∗,m′))s j =C′i∗,0.
Let SK j = s j and SKk = sk be the secret keys of two client indices j and k, andCK j,k = (K0,K1) = (gˆ
rs j , gˆrsk)
be the comparison key. Let CTj = ({Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n]) and CT
′
k = ({C
′
i,0,C
′
i,1}i∈[n]) be ciphertexts on messages
m and m′. If m < m′, there must be the smallest index i∗ such that xi = x
′
i for all i < i
∗ and xi∗ 6= x
′
i∗ . Thus,
we have that
e(Ci,0,K1) = e(H(E0(i,m))
s j , gˆrsk) = e(H(E0(i,m)), gˆ)
rs jsk
= e(H(E0(i,m
′))sk , gˆrs j) = e(C′i,0,K0) ∀i< i
∗ and
e(Ci∗,1,K1) = e(H(E1(i
∗,m))s j , gˆrsk) = e(H(E1(i
∗,m)), gˆ)rs jsk
= e(H(E0(i
∗,m′))sk , gˆrs j) = e(C′i∗,0,K0).
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3.4 Security Analysis
We prove the security of the basic MC-ORE scheme with the leakage function LS in the ST-SIM security
model. We define a sequence of experiments from H0 corresponding to the real experiment to H3 corre-
sponding to the ideal experiment and show that the outputs of two experiments are indistinguishable. At
first, the ciphertexts of clients whose comparison keys are not exposed are randomly generated. In the next
experiment, the ciphertexts of clients whose comparison keys are exposed are generated with random values.
Finally, in the last experiment H3, the ciphertexts are simulated with respect to the leakage function LS, and
consequently H3 corresponds to the ideal experiment. The details are given as follows.
Theorem 3.2. The basic MC-ORE scheme is ST-SIM secure with the leakage function LS in the random
oracle model if the XDH assumption holds.
Proof. We prove the security of the basic MC-ORE scheme through a sequence of hybrid experiments. The
first experiment is defined as the real MC-ORE security experiment and the last one is defined as the ideal
experiment with the leakage function LS in which the adversary has no advantage. The hybrid experiments
H0,H1,H2, and H3 are defined as follows:
H0 : This experiment corresponds to the real world experiment.
H1 : This experiment is similar to H0 except that the ciphertext CTj such that ( j, j
′) /∈ S for any client index
j′ is generated by using random elements.
H2 : This experiment is similar to H1 except that the ciphertext CTj such that ( j, j
′) ∈ S for some client
index j′ is generated by using random elements.
H3 : In this experiment, the ciphertexts are generated with the leakage function LS and the rest are same to
H2. This experiment corresponds to the ideal world experiment.
From the following Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 that claim the indistinguishability of the above experi-
ments, we have that H0 and H3 are computationally indistinguishable.
Before we present additional Lemmas for the proof of the above theorem, we define the encoded mes-
sages E0(k,m) = prefix(m,k)‖0xk and E1(k,m) = prefix(m,k)‖(0xk + 1) where m = x1 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n. In
addition, we introduce the multi-external Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Assumption 3.3 (Multi-External Diffie-Hellman, mXDH). Let (p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) be a tuple randomly gen-
erated by Gas(1
λ ) where p is a prime order of the groups. Let g, gˆ be random generators of groups G,Gˆ,
respectively. The mXDH assumption is that if the challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,g
a,{gbi,1 , · · · ,gbi,n}i∈[t]
)
and T
are given, no PPT algorithmA can distinguish T = T0=
(
{gabi,1 , · · · ,gabi,n}i∈[t]
)
from T = T1=
{
(gci,1 , · · · ,gci,n}i∈[t]
)
with more than a negligible advantage. The advantage ofA is defined as AdvmXDHA (λ )=
∣
∣Pr[A(D,T0)= 0]−
Pr[A(D,T1) = 0]
∣
∣ where the probability is taken over random choices of a,(bi,1, · · · ,bi,n),(ci,1, · · · ,ci,n)∈Zp
for all i ∈ [t].
This mXDH assumption is equivalent to the XDH assumption since the challenge tuple of mXDH as-
sumption can be obtained from the XDH assumption by using the random self-reducibility property [15].
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Lemma 3.4. The hybrid experiments H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable to the polynomial-
time adversary assuming that the mXDH assumption holds.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we additionally define a sequence of hybrid experiments H0 = H0,0,H0,1, . . . ,
H0,q˜ =H1 for some q˜ as follows.
H0,µ : Let I = ( j1, · · · , jq) be a tuple of challenge client index. For all ji ∈ I such that ( ji,∗) /∈ S, let
j∗1, · · · , j
∗
q˜ ∈ I be distinct client indices where q˜ ≤ q. Let SIµ = {i ∈ [q] : ji = j
∗
µ} be an index set of
same client indices where µ ∈ [q˜]. In this experiment, we change the generation of the µ-th ciphertext
set with the index set SIµ . If ℓ≤ µ , the ciphertexts in the ℓ-th ciphertext set with SIℓ are changed to
be random elements. Otherwise, the ciphertexts in the ℓ-th ciphertext set with SIℓ are generated by
running the normal encryption algorithm. Note that the ciphertexts with the client index ji such that
( ji,∗) ∈ S in H0,µ−1 and H0,µ are equally generated by running the normal encryption algorithm.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ( j∗µ ,∗) /∈ S. Suppose there exists an adversary A that
distinguishes H0,µ−1 from H0,µ with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the mXDH
assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,g
a,{gbi,1 , · · · ,gbi,2n}i∈[t]
)
and
T =
(
{Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,2n}i∈[t]
)
. B interacts with A as follows.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A and SIµ be the target index set of j
∗
µ . The simu-
lator B first sets the secret keys of all clients except the target client. For each j 6= j∗µ , it chooses a random
exponent s j and sets SK j = s j. For the target client index j
∗
µ , it implicitly sets SK j∗µ = a. Now, B can generate
any comparison keyCK j,k for all tuple ( j,k) ∈ S since it knows secret keys s j and sk if ( j,k) ∈ S.
To handle hash queries, B maintains a random oracle table TH for the consistency of a simulation.
Initially, B fixes some hash queries for the simulation of the ciphertext with the challenge tuple ( ji,mi)
such that i ∈ SIµ , which is output of A. For the first message m1, B sets hk,0 = g
b1,2k−1 ,hk,1 = g
b1,2k and
adds the tuples (E0(k,m1),hk,0) and (E1(k,m1),hk,1) to the table TH for all k ∈ [n]. For each message mi, B
first finds the biggest index d = ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i and finds tuples (E0(k,mi′),h
′
k,0),(E1(k,mi′),h
′
k,1)
from TH for all k ∈ [d]. It sets hk,0 = h
′
k,0,hk,1 = h
′
k,1 for all k ∈ [d− 1] since E0(k,mi′) = E0(k,mi) and
E1(k,mi′) = E1(k,mi). If cmp(mi,mi′) = 1, then B sets hd,0 = g
bi,2d−1,hd,1 = h
′
d,0 and otherwise, it sets
hd,0 = h
′
d,1,hd,1 = g
bi,2d . Next, it sets hk,0 = g
bi,2k−1 ,hk,1 = g
bi,2k for all k ∈ [d + 1,n]. It adds the tuples
(E0(k,mi),hk,0) and (E1(k,mi),hk,1) to the table TH for all k ∈ [n]. After that, if a random oracle query for
an encoded message Eβ (k,m) is requested for each β ∈ {0,1}, B first finds a tuple (Eβ (k,m),h) on the table
TH . If the tuple does not exist, then it chooses a random element h ∈ G and adds the tuple (Eβ (k,m),h) to
TH . Finally it gives h to A as a response.
To handle the creation of ciphertexts, B carefully uses the hash table and the challenge elements in
the assumption. Let (( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)) be the challenge tuples. If ( ji,∗) ∈ S, then B simply creates a
ciphertext by running the MC-ORE.Encrypt algorithm with hash queries since it knows the secret key s ji .
If ( ji,∗) /∈ S, then it means that i ∈ SIℓ for some ℓ ∈ [q˜]. B creates a set of ciphertexts with the index set SIℓ
for each ℓ ∈ [q˜] as follows:
• Case ℓ < µ : B creates the ciphertext for the index i ∈ SIℓ sequentially. For the smallest index i ∈ SIℓ,
it chooses random elements Rk,0,Rk,1 ∈G for all k ∈ [n] and creates CTji = ({Rk,0,Rk,1}k∈[n]). For the
next index i, it first finds the biggest index d = ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i. It setsCk,0 =C
′
k,0,Ck,1 =C
′
k,1
for all k ∈ [d− 1] where CTji′ = ({C
′
k,0,C
′
k,1}k∈[n]). If cmp(mi,mi′) = 1, then it chooses a random
element Rd,0 ∈ G and sets Cd,0 = Rd,0,Cd,1 =C
′
d,0. Otherwise, it chooses a random element Rd,1 ∈G
and sets Cd,0 = C
′
d,1,Cd,1 = Rd,1. Next, it chooses random elements Rk,0,Rk,1 ∈ G and sets Ck,0 =
Rk,0,Ck,1 = Rk,1 for all k ∈ [d+ 1,n]. It creates the ciphertext CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). At last, it
creates the ℓ-th ciphertext set CTSIℓ = ({CTji}i∈SIℓ).
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• Case ℓ= µ : B creates the ciphertext for the index i ∈ SIµ sequentially. For the smallest index i ∈ SIℓ,
B sets Ck,0 = X1,2k−1,Ck,1 = X1,2k for all k ∈ [n] and creates the ciphertext CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]).
For the next index i, B first finds the biggest index d = ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i. It sets Ck,0 =
C′k,0,Ck,1 = C
′
k,1 for all k ∈ [d − 1] where CTji′ = ({C
′
k,0,C
′
k,1}k∈[n]). If cmp(mi,mi′) = 1, then it
sets Cd,0 = Xi,2d−1,Cd,1 = C
′
d,0 and otherwise, it sets Cd,0 = C
′
d,1,Cd,1 = Xi,2d . Next, it sets Ck,0 =
Xi,2k−1,Ck,1 = Xi,2k for all k ∈ [d+ 1,n]. It creates the ciphertext CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). At last, it
creates the µ-th ciphertext set CTSIµ = ({CTji}i∈SIµ ). Note that it does not know the secret key a.
• Case ℓ > µ : It creates the ciphertext set CTSIℓ by running theMC-ORE.Encrypt algorithm with hash
queries.
If T =
(
(gab1,1 , · · · ,gab1,2n), . . . ,(gabt,1 , · · · ,gabt,2n)
)
, then CTSIµ are ciphertexts in H0,µ−1. Otherwise, CTSIµ
are ciphertexts in H0,µ . By the mXDH assumption, two experiments H0,µ−1 and H0,µ are computationally
indistinguishable.
Lemma 3.5. The hybrid experiments H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable to the polynomial-
time adversary assuming that the mXDH assumption holds.
Proof. We additionally define a sequence of hybrid experiments H1 =H1,0,H1,1, · · · ,H1,q˜ =H2 for some q˜
as follows.
H1,µ : Let I=( j1, · · · , jq) be a tuple of challenge client index and let j, j
′ ∈ I be co-related indices if ( j, j′)∈
S or there exist {ki}i∈[n] ⊆ I such that ( j,k1),(k1,k2), · · · ,(kn−1,kn),(kn, j
′)∈ S for any n ∈ [q−2]. Let
RIµ = {i∈ [q] : jis are co-related indices} be an index set of co-related client indices where µ ∈ [q˜]. In
this experiment, we change the generation of the µ-th ciphertext set with the index set RIµ . If ℓ≤ µ ,
the ciphertexts in the ℓ-th ciphertext set with RIℓ are changed to be random elements. Otherwise,
the ciphertexts in the ℓ-th ciphertext set with RIℓ are generated by running the normal encryption
algorithm. Note that the ciphertexts with the client index ji such that ( ji,∗) /∈ S in H1,µ−1 and H1,µ
are equally generated by using random elements.
Suppose there exists an adversaryA that distinguishes H1,µ−1 fromH1,µ with non-negligible advantage.
A simulator B that solves the mXDH assumption usingA is given: a challenge tupleD=
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g,
gˆ,ga,{gbi,1 , · · · ,gbi,2n}i∈[t]
)
and T =
(
{Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,2n}i∈[t]
)
. B interacts with A as follows.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A and RIµ be the target index set. The simulator
B first sets the secret keys of clients as follows. For each j = ji, if i /∈ RIµ , it chooses a random exponent
s j ∈ Zp and sets SK j = s j. Otherwise, it chooses a random exponent s j ∈ Zp and implicitly sets SK j = as j.
Then, B can generate a comparison keyCK j,k = (gˆ
rs j , gˆrsk) for each tuple ( j,k)∈ Swith the help of a random
exponent r ∈ Zp, though it does not know a.
To handle hash queries, B maintains a random oracle table TH for the consistency of a simulation. This
simulation is same to the proof of the Theorem 3.4 except that B fixes some hash queries for the simulation
of the ciphertext with the challenge tuple ( ji,mi) such that i ∈ RIµ .
To handle the creation of ciphertexts, B carefully uses the hash table and the challenge elements in the
assumption. Let (( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)) be the challenge tuples. If ( ji,∗) /∈ S, then B creates a ciphertext by
using random elements as in H1,µ−1. If ( ji,∗) ∈ S, then it means that i ∈ RIℓ for some ℓ ∈ [q˜]. B creates a
set of ciphertexts with the index set RIℓ for each ℓ ∈ [q˜] as follows:
• Case ℓ < µ : B creates the ciphertext for the index i ∈ RIℓ sequentially. For the smallest index
i ∈ RIℓ, it chooses random elements Rk,0,Rk,1 ∈ G and computes Ck,0 = R
s ji
k,0,Ck,1 = R
s ji
k,1 for all
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k ∈ [n]. It creates CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). For the next index i, B first finds the biggest index
d = ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i and computes s = s ji/s ji′ . It computes Ck,0 =C
′s
k,0,Ck,1 =C
′s
k,1 for all
k ∈ [d− 1] where CTji′ = ({C
′
k,0,C
′
k,1}k∈[n]). If cmp(mi,mi′) = 1, then it chooses a random element
Rd,0 ∈ G and computes Cd,0 = R
s ji
d,0,Cd,1 = C
′s
d,0. Otherwise, it chooses a random element Rd,1 ∈ G
and computesCd,0 =C
′s
d,1,Cd,1 = R
s ji
d,1. Next, it chooses random elements Rk,0,Rk,1 ∈G and computes
Ck,0 = R
s ji
k,0,Ck,1 = R
s ji
k,1 for all k ∈ [d+1,n]. It creates the ciphertext CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). At last,
it creates the ℓ-th ciphertext set CTRIℓ = {CTji}i∈RIℓ .
• Case ℓ = µ : B creates the ciphertext for the index i ∈ RIµ sequentially. For the smallest index
i ∈ RIµ , B computes Ck,0 = X
s ji
1,2k−1,Ck,1 = X
s ji
1,2k for all k ∈ [n] and creates the ciphertext CTji =
({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). For the next index i, B first finds the biggest index d = ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i
and it computes s = s ji/s ji′ . It computes Ck,0 = C
′s
k,0,Ck,1 = C
′s
k,1 for all k ∈ [d− 1] where CTji′ =
({C′k,0,C
′
k,1}k∈[n]). If cmp(mt ,mt ′) = 1, then B computes Cd,0 = X
s ji
i,2d−1,Cd,1 =C
′s
d,0 and otherwise, it
computes Cd,0 =C
′s
d,1,Cd,1 = X
s ji
i,2d . Next, it computes Ck,0 = X
s ji
i,2k−1,Ck,1 = X
s ji
i,2k for all k ∈ [d+1,n].
Then, it creates the ciphertext CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). At last, it creates the µ-th ciphertext set
CTRIµ = {CTji}i∈RIµ . Note that it does not know the secret key a.
• Case ℓ > µ : It creates the ciphertext set CTRIℓ by running the MC-ORE.Encrypt algorithm with
hash queries.
If T =
(
(gab1,1 , · · · ,gab1,2n), . . . ,(gabt,1 , · · · ,gabt,2n)
)
, then CTRIµ are ciphertexts in H1,µ−1. Otherwise, CTRIµ
are ciphertexts in H1,µ . By the mXDH assumption, two experiments H1,µ−1 and H1,µ are computationally
indistinguishable.
Lemma 3.6. The hybrid experiments H2 and H3 are indistinguishable to the polynomial-time adversary
with the leakage function LS in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes H2 from H3 with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an efficient simulator B for which the two distributions H2 and H3 are statistically indistin-
guishable.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A. B first outputs random public parameters PP
with the initial state stB . It selects a random secret key SK j = s j ∈ Zp for each client index j ∈ [N] and it
can generate any comparison key CK j,k for ( j,k) ∈ S since it knows all secret keys.
To handle hash queries, B maintains a random oracle table TH for consistency of the simulation. If
a random oracle query for Eβ (k,m) is requested for each β ∈ {0,1}, B first finds the tuple (Eβ (k,m),h)
from the table TH . If the tuple does not exist, then it chooses a random element h ∈ G and adds the tuple
(Eβ (k,m),h) to TH . Finally it gives h to A as a response.
To handle the creation of ciphertexts, B also maintains a ciphertext table TCT for consistency of the
simulation. Let I = ( j1, · · · , jq) be a tuple of challenge client index. For all ji ∈ I such that ( ji,∗) /∈ S, let
j∗1, · · · , j
∗
q˜1
∈ I be distinct client indices and SIµ = {i ∈ [q] : ji = j
∗
µ} be an index set of same client indices
where µ ∈ [q˜1]. For all ji ∈ I such that ( ji,∗) ∈ S, let RIµ = {i ∈ [q] : jis are co-related indices} be an index
set of co-related client indices where µ ∈ [q˜2]. B simulates the creation of a set of ciphertexts with a client
index set SIµ or RIµ by using stB and LS(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)) as follows:
• For the creation of the ciphertexts with each set SIµ , B initiates the ciphertext table TCT . For the small-
est index i∈ SIµ , B chooses random elements (ck,0,ck,1)∈G×G and sets (Ck,0,Ck,1) = (ck,0,ck,1) for
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all k ∈ [n]. It adds the tuple (i,(c1,0,c1,1), . . . ,(cn,0,cn,1)) to TCT and creates CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]).
For the next index i ∈ SIℓ, it creates the ciphertext sequentially as follows. It first finds the biggest
index b= ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′ < i and then finds a tuple (i′,(c′1,0,c
′
1,1), . . . ,(c
′
n,0,c
′
n,1)) from the table
TCT . If b= n+1, it sets (ck,0,ck,1) = (c
′
k,0,c
′
k,1) for all k ∈ [n]. If not, it proceeds the following steps:
1. It sets (ck,0,ck,1) = (c
′
k,0,c
′
k,1) for all k ∈ [b−1].
2. It chooses random elements (ck,0,ck,1) ∈G×G for all k ∈ [b+1,n].
3. If cmp(mt ,mt ′) = 1, it sets cb,1 = c
′
b,0 and chooses a random element cb,0 ∈G. Otherwise, it sets
cb,0 = c
′
b,1 and chooses a random element cb,1 ∈G.
Then, B creates CTji = ({ck,0,ck,1}k∈[n]) and adds the tuple (i,(c1,0,c1,1), . . . ,(cn,0,cn,1)) to TCT . At
last, it creates the ciphertext set CTSIµ = ({CTji}i∈SIµ ).
• For the creation of the ciphertext with each set RIµ , B initiates the ciphertext table TCT . For the
smallest index i ∈ RIµ , B chooses random elements (ck,0,ck,1) ∈ G×G and computes (Ck,0,Ck,1) =
(c
s ji
k,0,c
s ji
k,1) for all k ∈ [n]. It adds the tuple (i,(c1,0,c1,1), . . . ,(cn,0,cn,1)) to TCT and creates CTji =
({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]). For the next index i ∈ RIµ , it creates the ciphertext sequentially as follows. It first
finds the biggest index b= ind(mi,mi′) for any i
′< i and then finds a tuple (i′,(c′1,0,c
′
1,1), . . . ,(c
′
n,0,c
′
n,1))
from the table TCT . If b = n+ 1, it sets (ck,0,ck,1) = (c
′
k,0,c
′
k,1) for all k ∈ [n]. If not, it proceeds the
steps 1)−3) described in the creation of the CTSIµ . Then, B computes (Ck,0,Ck,1) = (c
s ji
k,0,c
s ji
k,1) for all
k ∈ [n]. It creates CTji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]) and adds the tuple (i,(c1,0,c1,1), . . . ,(cn,0,cn,1)) to TCT . At
last, it creates the ciphertext set CTRIµ = ({CTji}i∈RIµ ).
Correctness of the Simulation. To show the correctness of the simulation, we prove that the distributions(
(CTSI1 , . . . ,CTSIq˜1 ),(CTRI1 , . . . ,CTRIq˜2 )
)
and
(
(CTSI1 , . . . ,CTSIq˜1 ),(CTRI1 , . . . ,CTRIq˜2 )
)
of the ciphertexts
output in H2 and H3 are statistically indistinguishable and the outputs of random oracle are properly simu-
lated. We have to show that the following conditions hold.
• ∀ℓ ∈ [q˜1],∀ℓ
′ ∈ [q˜2], CTSIℓ and CTRIℓ′ are distributed independently.
• ∀ℓ ∈ [q˜1],∀ℓ
′ ∈ [q˜2], CTSIℓ ≡ CTSIℓ and CTRIℓ′ ≡ CTRIℓ′ .
The first condition is simply proved since each ciphertext for SIℓ and RIℓ′ are simulated independently. Next,
we use induction to prove that the second condition holds as follows.
• For each ℓ ∈ [q˜1], let CTSIℓ = (CT1, · · · ,CTt) and CTSIℓ = (CT 1, · · · ,CT t). Obviously, the statement is
true for i= 1. Assume that it is true for i−1 and we must prove that (CT1, . . . ,CTi)≡ (CT 1, . . . ,CT i).
Suppose that CTi,CTi′ are the ciphertexts of m,m
′ where i′ < i. For the biggest index b = ind(m,m′),
if b= n+1, then CTi and CTi′ are the ciphertexts of the same message. In the simulation, B finds the
tuple (−,(c′1,0,c
′
1,1), . . . ,(c
′
n,0,c
′
n,1)) from the table TCT and uses it to simulate the ciphertext CTi by
setting (Ck,0,Ck,1) = (c
′
k,0,c
′
k,1) for all k ∈ [n]. Then, we have
Ck,0 = ck,0 = c
′
k,0 =C
′
k,0 ∀k ∈ [n].
Otherwise, m and m′ may have the same prefix of the length b−1. For k ∈ [b−1], (Ck,0,Ck,1) has been
simulated as the previous case and for k ∈ [b+1,n], (Ck,0,Ck,1) has been simulated by using random
elements. For the remain part (Cb,0,Cb,1), B simulates cb,1 = c
′
b,0 if cmp(m,m
′) = 1. Then we have
C′b,0 = c
′
b,0 = cb,1 =Cb,1.
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Since we assumed that CTi′ and CT i′ are identically distributed, by induction, CTi and CT i are identi-
cally distributed.
• For each ℓ∈ [q˜2], let CTRIℓ = (CT1, · · · ,CTt) and CTRIℓ = (CT 1, · · · ,CT t). Obviously, the statement is
true for i= 1. Assume that it is true for i−1 and we must prove that (CT1, . . . ,CTi)≡ (CT 1, . . . ,CT i).
Suppose that CTi,CTi′ are the ciphertexts of ( j,m),( j
′,m′) where i′ < i. For the biggest index b =
ind(m,m′), if b= n+1, thenCTj andCTj′ are the ciphertexts of the same message. In the simulation,
B finds the tuple (−,(c′1,0,c
′
1,1), . . . ,(c
′
n,0,c
′
n,1)) from the table TCT and uses it to simulate the ciphertext
CTi by computing (Ck,0,Ck,1) = (c
′
k,0
s j ,c′k,1
s j) for all k ∈ [n]. LetCK j, j′ = (K0,K1) and we have
e(Ck,0,K0) = e(ck,0
s j ,K0) = e(c
′
k,0
s j ,K0) = e(c
′
k,0
s j′ ,K1) = e(C
′
k,0,K1) ∀k ∈ [n].
Otherwise, m and m′ may have the same prefix of the length b−1. For k ∈ [b−1], (Ck,0,Ck,1) has been
simulated as the previous case and for k ∈ [b+1,n], (Ck,0,Ck,1) has been simulated by using random
elements. For the remain part (Cb,0,Cb,1), B simulates cb,1 = c
′
b,0 if cmp(m,m
′) = 1. Then we have
e(Cb,1,K0) = e(cb,1
s j ,K0) = e(c
′
b,0
s j ,K0) = e(c
′
b,0
s j′ ,K1) = e(C
′
b,0,K1).
Since we assumed that CTi′ and CT i′ are identically distributed, by induction, CTi and CT i are identi-
cally distributed.
In addition, suppose that the tuple (E0(k,m),h) is in TH and (i,(c1,0,c1,1), . . . ,(cn,0,cn,1)) is in TCT for
some i such that mi = m. By the Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, A can not find out that h and ck,0 are different. This
completes the correctness of simulation.
3.5 Extensions
We present several extensions of our basic MC-ORE scheme to overcome their shortcomings.
Reducing Trust on the Center. The basic MC-ORE scheme has the problem that a center should be fully
trusted because it generates the secret keys of individual clients and comparison keys of different clients.
The existence of a trusted center is very strong constraint and it is costly to ensure the security of such a
center in reality. One way to reduce trust on the center is that each client himself selects a secret key and
securely transfers the corresponding information to the center instead of having the center owns the secret
keys. That is, each client chooses its secret key s j and securely sends gˆ
s j to the center, and then the center
can generate a comparison key CK = ((gˆs j )r,(gˆsk)r) by using gˆs j , gˆsk received from clients and a random
exponent r. In this case, the center only can generate comparison keys, but it can not generate client’s
ciphertexts since it does not have the secret keys of individual clients.
Removing the Trusted Center. Unlike the previous ORE schemes, our basic MC-ORE scheme requires a
center to generate secret keys of individual clients and comparison keys between different clients. Although
we suggested a method to reduce trust on the center, we cannot remove the ability of the center to generate
comparison keys. Note that if a comparison key is exposed, a malicious client can compare any ciphertexts
between two clients by using the exposed comparison key. One idea to securely generate a comparison key
even after the center is completely removed is that two clients perform a cryptographic protocol to share
the same random value gˆr which is used to create gˆrs j and gˆrsk . The simplest way to non-interactively share
the random value is to use a hash function. That is, two clients with indices j and k generate H( j‖k)s j
and H( j‖k)sk respectively, and transmit these values to a third client. Note that these values are a valid
comparison key since H( j‖k) corresponds to gˆr for some random exponent r.
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4 Enhanced MC-ORE Construction
In this section, we propose our second construction of MC-OREwith reduced leakage and prove the ST-SIM
security of our scheme.
4.1 Construction
In the basic MC-ORE scheme, both ciphertext comparisons in a single client and between different clients
leak the most significant differing bit as well as the result of the comparison. Although there are some
ORE schemes with reduced leakage [5, 13], it is difficult to extend those schemes to support comparisons
on ciphertexts generated by different clients. To build an MC-ORE scheme with reduced leakage, we divide
the ciphertext into independent two parts such that the first part only supports ciphertext comparisons in a
single client, and the second part only supports ciphertext comparisons between different clients. For the
first part, we use any ORE scheme with reduced leakage. For the second part, we construct an encrypted
ORE (EORE) scheme by modifying our basic MC-ORE scheme so that it can not be used for ciphertext
comparisons in a single client. If the second part has no leakage until a comparison key is provided, only
the reduced leakage of the ORE scheme affects the overall leakage.
Encrypted ORE.Wefirst construct an EORE scheme by modifying our basic MC-ORE scheme. The syntax
of EORE is very similar to that of MC-ORE defined in Definition 2.2 except that the comparison algorithm
is excluded. The ciphertext of the EORE scheme is created by first generating a ciphertext of the basic
MC-ORE scheme and then encrypting it with a public-key encryption scheme. The comparison key of the
EORE scheme includes additional elements that decrypt the encrypted ciphertext to obtain the comparison
form of the basic MC-ORE scheme. The ciphertext comparison is performed in a similar manner to the
basic MC-ORE scheme.
Let S = {( j,k)} j,k∈[N] be a set of index tuples where the comparison key CK j,k is revealed. A leakage
function LEORES is defined as follows:
LEORES
(
( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)
)
=
{
cmp(mi′ ,mi), ind(mi′ ,mi) : 1≤ i
′ < i≤ q,( ji′ , ji) ∈ S
}
.
Our EORE scheme with leakage LEORES is given as follows:
EORE.Setup(1λ ,N). This algorithm first generates bilinear groups G,Gˆ,GT of prime order p with group
generators g ∈ G and gˆ ∈ Gˆ. It chooses random exponents s j,a j ∈ Zp and computes h j = g
a j and
hˆ j = gˆ
a j for all j ∈ [N]. It outputs a master key MK =
(
{s j, hˆ j} j∈[N]
)
and public parameters PP =(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,{h j} j∈[N],H
)
where H : {0,1}∗ →G is a full-domain hash function.
EORE.GenKey( j,MK,PP). Let MK = ({s1, · · · ,sN},{hˆ1, · · · , hˆN}). It outputs a secret key SK j = s j.
EORE.Encrypt(m,SK j,PP). Let m = x1x2 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n and SK j = s j. For each i ∈ [n], it computes
Fi,0 = H(prefix(m, i)‖0xi)
s j and Fi,1 = H(prefix(m, i)‖(0xi + 1))
s j . For each Fi,b, it selects a ran-
dom exponent t ∈ Zp and computes Ci,b,0 = Fi,bh
t
j and Ci,b,1 = g
t . It outputs a ciphertext CTj =(
{Ci,b,0,Ci,b,1}i∈[n],b∈{0,1}
)
.
EORE.GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP). Let s j and sk be the secret keys of client indices j and k. It chooses a
random exponent r ∈ Zp and computes K0,0 = gˆ
rs j ,K0,1 = hˆ
rs j
k and K1,0 = gˆ
rsk ,K1,1 = hˆ
rsk
j . It outputs
the comparison key CK j,k = ({Kb,0,Kb,1}b∈{0,1}).
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EORE.CompareMC(CTj,CT
′
k ,CK j,k,PP). LetCTj = ({Ci,b,0,Ci,b,1}) andCT
′
k = ({C
′
i,b,0,C
′
i,b,1}) for i ∈ [n]
and b ∈ {0,1}. LetCK j,k = ({Kb,0,Kb,1}b∈{0,1}). It first finds the smallest index i
∗ such that
e(Ci∗,0,0,K1,0)/e(Ci∗ ,0,1,K1,1) 6= e(C
′
i∗,0,0,K0,0)/e(C
′
i∗ ,0,1,K0,1)
by sequentially comparing these values from an index 0 to n. If such index i∗ exists and e(Ci∗,1,0,K1,0)
/e(Ci∗ ,1,1,K1,1) = e(C
′
i∗,0,0,K0,0)/e(C
′
i∗ ,0,1,K0,1) holds, then it outputs 1. If such index i
∗ exists and
e(Ci∗,0,0,K1,0)/e(Ci∗ ,0,1,K1,1) = e(C
′
i∗,1,0,K0,0)/e(C
′
i∗,1,1,K0,1), then it outputs 0. If no such index i
∗
exists, then it outputs 0.
Remark 4.1. The leakage function LEORES is same to the leakage function LS of the basic MC-ORE scheme
except that it excludes the condition ji′ = ji. It means that the basic MC-ORE scheme leaks the comparison
result between ciphertexts of a single client, but the EORE scheme does not leak any information before the
comparison key is revealed.
Multi-Client ORE. Now we construct an enhanced MC-ORE scheme by composing any ORE scheme with
reduced leakage and the above EORE scheme. As mentioned before, the ciphertext of the enhanced MC-
ORE scheme consists of two parts such that the first part is created from the ORE scheme and the second
part is created from the EORE scheme.
Let LOREj be the leakage function of the underlying ORE scheme corresponding to the client index j and
LEORES be the leakage function of our EORE scheme. A leakage function L
MC-ORE
S is defined as follows:
LMC-ORES
(
( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq)
)
=
{
LOREj (mi1 , · · · ,miρ )∪L
EORE
S : j = ji1 = · · ·= jiρ
}
.
where the sequence sets M j = {mi1 , · · · ,miρ} satisfy
⋂
M j = /0 and
⋃
M j = {m1, · · · ,mq}. Here, if S = /0,
meaning that any comparison key is not revealed, then LMC-ORES becomes equal to the reduced leakage
functions {LOREj } for each j. Otherwise, if S 6= /0, to achieve reducing the leakage, the ORE scheme is
restricted from having no leakage beyond the leakage of the EORE scheme for the same client. That is,
LMC-ORES will be at most L
EORE
S . Our MC-ORE scheme with leakage L
MC-ORE
S that combines an ORE
scheme and our EORE scheme is described as follows:
MC-ORE.Setup(1λ ,N). It obtains MKEORE and PPEORE by running EORE.Setup(1
λ ,N) and outputs
MK =MKEORE and PP= PPEORE .
MC-ORE.GenKey( j,MK,PP). It runsORE.Setup(1λ ) andEORE.GenKey( j,MK,PP) to obtain SKORE, j
and SKEORE, j, respectively. It outputs a secret key SK j = (SKORE, j,SKEORE, j).
MC-ORE.Encrypt(m,SK j,PP). Let SK j = (SKORE, j,SKEORE, j). It first obtains OC j and EC j by running
ORE.Encrypt(m,SKORE, j) and EORE.Encrypt(m,SKEORE, j,PP) respectively. It outputs a cipher-
text CTj = (OC j,EC j).
MC-ORE.Compare(CTj,CT
′
j ,PP). LetCTj = (OC j,EC j) andCT
′
j = (OC
′
j,EC
′
j) for the same client index
j. It returns ORE.Compare(OC j,OC
′
j).
MC-ORE.GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP). Let SK j and SKk be the secret keys for the client indices j and k. It
outputs the comparison key CK j,k by running EORE.GenCmpKey( j,k,MK,PP).
MC-ORE.CompareMC(CTj,CT
′
k ,CK j,k,PP). LetCTj = (OC j,EC j) and CT
′
k = (OC
′
k,EC
′
k). It returns the
result of EORE.CompareMC(EC j,EC
′
k,CK j,k,PP).
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4.2 Correctness
For the ciphertext comparisons in a single client, the correctness follows from that of the underlying ORE
scheme. For the ciphertext comparisons between different clients, the correctness is shown as follows. Let
SK j = s j and SKk = sk be the secret keys of client indices j and k, and CK j,k = (K0,0,K0,1,K1,0,K1,1) =
(gˆrs j , hˆ
rs j
k , gˆ
rsk , hˆrskj ) be the comparison key of ( j,k). Let EC j =
(
{Ci,b,0,Ci,b,1}i∈[n],b∈{0,1}
)
and EC′k =(
{C′i,b,0,C
′
i,b,1}i∈[n],b∈{0,1}
)
be ciphertexts on messages m and m′. If m < m′, there must be a smallest in-
dex i∗ such that xi = x
′
i for all i< i
∗ and xi∗ 6= x
′
i∗ . Then we have that
e(Ci,0,0,K1,0)/e(Ci,0,1,K1,1) = e(H(E0(i,m))
s jhtj, gˆ
rsk)/e(gt , hˆrskj ) = e(H(E0(i,m)), gˆ)
rs jsk
= e(H(E0(i,m
′))skht
′
k , gˆ
rs j)/e(gt
′
, hˆ
rs j
k ) = e(C
′
i,0,0,K0,0)/e(C
′
i,0,1,K0,1) ∀i< i
∗,
e(Ci∗,1,0,K1,0)/e(Ci∗,1,1,K1,1) = e(H(E1(i
∗,m))s jhtj, gˆ
rsk)/e(gt , hˆrskj ) = e(H(E1(i
∗,m)), gˆ)rs jsk
= e(H(E0(i
∗,m′))skht
′
k , gˆ
rs j)/e(gt
′
, hˆ
rs j
k ) = e(C
′
i∗,0,0,K0,0)/e(C
′
i∗,0,1,K0,1).
4.3 Security Analysis
We now prove the security of the enhanced MC-ORE scheme with the leakage function LMC-ORES in the ST-
SIM security model. We begin by giving a high-level overview of the security proof. We define a sequence of
experiments from H0 corresponding to the real experiment to H4 corresponding to the ideal experiment and
show that the outputs of two experiments are indistinguishable. Since the ciphertext is divided into two parts:
the ORE ciphertext OC, and the EORE ciphertext EC, the hybrid experiments are also defined separately. At
first, the ORE ciphertexts are simulated only with the leakage functions LOREj . In the next experiment, the
EORE ciphertexts of clients whose comparison keys are not exposed are randomly generated. Then, in the
next experiment, the EORE ciphertexts of clients whose comparison keys are exposed are generated with
random values. Finally, in the last experiment H4, the EORE ciphertexts of clients whose comparison keys
are exposed are simulated with respect to the leakage function LEORES , and consequently H4 corresponds to
the ideal experiment. The details are given as follows.
Theorem 4.2. The enhanced MC-ORE scheme is ST-SIM secure with the leakage function LMC-ORES in the
random oracle model if the ORE scheme is SIM secure with the leakage function LORE , the basic MC-ORE
scheme is ST-SIM secure with the leakage function LS, and the XDH assumption holds.
Proof. We prove the security of our enhanced MC-ORE scheme through a sequence of hybrid experiments.
The first experiment is defined as the real MC-ORE security experiment and the last one is defined as the
ideal experiment with the leakage function LMC-ORES in which the adversary has no advantage. The hybrid
experiments H0,H1,H2,H3, and H4 are defined as follows:
H0 : This experiment corresponds to the real world experiment.
H1 : In this experiment, the ORE ciphertexts OC j are generated with the leakage function L
ORE
j and the
rest are same to H0. We have that H0 and H1 are indistinguishable if the underlying ORE scheme is
secure with respect to the leakage function LORE .
H2 : This experiment is similar to H1 except that the EORE ciphertext EC j such that ( j, j
′) 6∈ S for any
client index j′ is generated by using random elements.
H3 : This experiment is similar to H2 except that the EORE ciphertext EC j such that ( j, j
′) ∈ S for some
client indices j′ is generated by using random elements.
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H4 : In this experiment, the EORE ciphertext EC ji such that ( ji, j)∈ S for some client indices j is generated
with the leakage function LEORES and the rest are same toH3. This experiment corresponds to the ideal
world experiment.
From the following Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 that claim the indistinguishability of the experiments,
we have that H0 and H4 are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 4.3. The hybrid experiments H0 and H1 are computationally indistinguishable to the polynomial-
time adversary if the underlying ORE scheme is SIM secure with the leakage function LORE .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is simple since a ciphertext CTj consists of two independent part OC j and
EC j. A simulator can use the simulator of the ORE scheme for the generation of OC j and it can generate
other elements in EC j by the randomly chosen master key of an EORE scheme.
Lemma 4.4. The hybrid experiments H1 and H2 are computationally indistinguishable to the polynomial-
time adversary assuming that the mXDH assumption holds.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we define a sequence of hybrid experiments H1 =H1,0,H1,1, · · · ,H1,q =H2 as
follows.
H1,µ : In this experiment, we change the generation of the µ-th ciphertext if ( jµ ,∗) /∈ S. If i ≤ µ and
( ji,∗) /∈ S, the i-th EORE ciphertext EC ji is generated by using random elements. Otherwise, the i-th
EORE ciphertext EC ji is generated by running the normal encryption algorithm. Note thatH1,µ−1 and
H1,µ are trivially equal if ( ji,∗) ∈ S.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ( jµ ,∗) /∈ S. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distin-
guishes H1,µ−1 from H1,µ with non-negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the mXDH assumption
using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g, gˆ,g
a,gb1 , · · · ,gb2n)
)
and T = (X1, · · · ,X2n). B
interacts with A as follows.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A. The simulator B first sets the public parameters
corresponding to the client index. For each j ∈ [N], if j 6= jµ , S chooses a random exponent α j ∈ Zp and
computes h j = g
α j . For the target client jµ , it sets h jµ = g
a. Next, for each j ∈ [N], B chooses a random
exponent s j ∈ Zp and sets the secret key SK j = s j. It can generate the comparison key CK j,k for any tuple
( j,k) ∈ S since it knows secret keys s j and sk.
Let ( ji,mi) be the i-th ciphertext query for a client index ji. Let E0(k,m) = prefix(m,k)‖0xk and
E1(k,m) = prefix(m,k)‖(0xk + 1) be encoded messages where m = x1 · · ·xn ∈ {0,1}
n. If ( ji,∗) ∈ S, then
B simply creates a ciphertext by running the EORE.Encrypt algorithm since it know the secret key s ji . If
( ji,∗) /∈ S, then B creates the i-th EORE ciphertext EC ji as follows:
• Case i < µ : It chooses random elements Rk,0 = (Rk,0,0,Rk,1,0),Rk,1 = (Rk,0,1,Rk,1,1) ∈ G×G for all
k ∈ [n] and creates EC ji = ({Rk,0,Rk,1}k∈[n]).
• Case i= µ : For each β ∈ {0,1}, it computes Fk,β = H(Eβ (k,mi))
s ji for all k ∈ [n]. For each Fk,0 and
Fk,1, it setsCk,0 = (Fk,0 ·X2k−1,g
b2k−1) andCk,1 = (Fk,1 ·X2k,g
b2k) and creates EC ji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]).
• Case i> µ : It creates the EORE ciphertext EC ji by running the EORE.Encrypt algorithm.
If T = (gab1 , · · · ,gab2n), then EC jµ is a ciphertext in H1,µ−1. Otherwise, EC jµ is a ciphertext in H1,µ . By the
mXDH assumption, two experiments H1,µ−1 and H1,µ are computationally indistinguishable.
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Lemma 4.5. The hybrid experiments H2 and H3 are computationally indistinguishable to the polynomial-
time adversary assuming that the mXDH assumption holds.
Proof. We additionally define a sequence of hybrid experiments H2 =H2,0,H2,1, · · · ,H2,q˜ =H3 for some q˜
as follows.
H2,µ : Let I= ( j1, · · · , jq) be a tuple of challenge client index andRIµ = {i∈ [q] : jis are co-related indices}
be an index set of co-related client indices where µ ∈ [q˜]. In this experiment, we change the generation
of the µ-th EORE ciphertext set with the index set RIµ . If ℓ ≤ µ , the EORE ciphertexts in the ℓ-th
ciphertext set with RIℓ are changed to be random elements. Otherwise, the ciphertexts in the ℓ-th
ciphertext set with RIℓ are generated by running the normal encryption algorithm. Note that the
ciphertexts with the client index ji such that ( ji,∗) /∈ S in H2,µ−1 and H2,µ are equally generated by
using random elements.
Suppose there exists an adversaryA that distinguishes H2,µ−1 fromH2,µ with non-negligible advantage.
A simulator B that solves the mXDH assumption usingA is given: a challenge tupleD=
(
(p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e),g,
gˆ,ga,{gbi,1 , · · · ,gbi,2n}i∈[t]
)
and T =
(
{Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,2n}i∈[t]
)
. B runs the simulator BbMC-ORE of the Lemma 3.5
as a subsimulator by submitting the challenge tuple of the mXDH assumption. Then B that interacts withA
is described as follows.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A. The simulator B first sets the public parameters
corresponding to the client index. For each j ∈ [N], S chooses a random exponent α j ∈ Zp and computes
h j = g
α j . For each tuple ( j,k) ∈ S, B obtains CK′j,k = (K0,K1) by running BbMC-ORE and computes the
comparison key CK j,k = (K0,K0
αk ,K1,K
α j
1 ).
For the creation of the EORE ciphertexts with the client index ji for i ∈ RIℓ, B first runs BbMC-ORE
and obtains CT ′ji = ({Fk,0,Fk,1}k∈[n]). For each Fk,b, it chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes
Ck,b = (Fk,b · h ji
t ,gt) where b ∈ {0,1}. It creates EC ji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]) and hence creates the EORE
ciphertext set ECRIℓ = ({EC ji}i∈RIℓ)
By the Lemma 3.5, two experiments H2,µ−1 and H2,µ are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 4.6. The hybrid experiments H3 and H4 are indistinguishable to the polynomial-time adversary
with the leakage function LEORES in the random oracle model.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes H3 from H4 with non-negligible advantage.
We construct an efficient simulator B for which the two distributions H3 and H4 are statistically indistin-
guishable. B runs the simulator BbMC-ORE of the Lemma 3.6 as a subsimulator.
Let (stA,S,(( j1,m1), · · · ,( jq,mq))) be the output of A. The simulator B first sets the public parameters
corresponding to the client index. For each j ∈ [N], B chooses a random exponent α j ∈ Zp and computes
h j = g
α j . For each tuple ( j,k) ∈ S, B obtains CK′j,k = (K0,K1) by running BbMC-ORE and computes the
comparison key CK j,k = (K0,K0
αk ,K1,K
α j
1 ).
For the generation of the i-th EORE ciphertext EC ji with the client index ji, B first runs BbMC-ORE
and obtains CT ′ji = ({Fk,0,Fk,1}k∈[n]). For each Fk,b, it chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and computes
Ck,b = (Fk,b ·h ji
t ,gt) where b ∈ {0,1}. It creates EC ji = ({Ck,0,Ck,1}k∈[n]).
By the Lemma 3.6, the distributions (CT ′j1 , . . . ,CT
′
jq
) and (CT ′ j1 , . . . ,CT
′
jq) of the basic MC-ORE ci-
phertexts output in H2 and H3 of the Theorem 3.2 are indistinguishable. Thus, it can be easily derived that
the distributions (EC j1 , . . . ,EC jq) and (EC j1 , . . . ,EC jq) in H3 and H4 are also indistinguishable. Since OC j
and EC j have been generated with respect to L
ORE
j and L
EORE
S , H4 corresponds to the ideal experiment.
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Table 1: Performance comparison between our MC-ORE schemes
Scheme Encrypt (ms) Compare (µs) CompareMC (ms) |CT | |CK|
Basic MC-ORE 45.8 1.65 35.6 2n|G| 2|Gˆ|
Encrypted ORE 107.4 - 58.2 > 4n|G| 4|Gˆ|
5 Implementation
In this section, we measure the performance of our MC-ORE schemes and compare various ciphertext
comparison methods. Our implementation is entirely written in C and employs a 224-bit MNT curves from
the PBC library for pairing operations. We run our implementation on a laptop with 4GHz Intel Core i7-
6700K CPU and 16GB RAM.
5.1 Performance of MC-ORE
We evaluate the runtime of Encrypt, Compare, and CompareMC algorithms for 32-bit integers and the
benchmarks averaged over 100 iterations are given in Table 1. Compared to the basic MC-ORE scheme,
the encrypted ORE scheme takes more time to run each algorithm and the size of the ciphertext and the
comparison key is about twice as large. The reason why the encrypted ORE scheme is less efficient is that
its Encrypt algorithm runs the Encrypt algorithm of the basic MC-ORE scheme as a subalgorithm and
the CompareMC algorithm requires twice as many pairing operations as the basic MC-ORE scheme. This
shows that although the security of the MC-ORE scheme is improved by reducing the leakage, at the same
time, the efficiency is decreased. We note that the runtime of the Compare algorithm and the accurate size
of the ciphertext of the enhanced MC-ORE scheme depend on the underlying ORE scheme.
5.2 Range Query Methods
One possible application of MC-ORE is a range query for an encrypted database, in which case a database
server must perform the multi-client comparison algorithm many times to find a subset of database that
satisfies the range query. Suppose that a database sever keeps each client database D j ∈ [R]
M that store
ciphertexts generated by a client with index j where the database consists of maximum M values each in
the range [R]. A client with an index k may request a range query by giving CT ′ on a plaintext m′ encrypted
with SKk to find a subset of ciphertexts in D j less than m
′. If the server has a comparison key CK j,k, then
it can answer the query by simply running the multi-client comparison algorithm M times. However, this
naive method is very slow since M multi-client comparison operations are required. Therefore, we need
better methods to handle range queries by using comparison operations more efficiently.
We present two additional methods and compare these methods with the simple method described be-
fore. The detailed explanation of each method is given as follows.
• Simple Method. The simple method simply runs the CompareMC algorithm M times. Recall that
the CompareMC algorithm tries to find the MSDB from the higher bit to the lower bit sequentially.
If the MSDB is located in higher bits, then the comparison operation is considerably efficient. On the
other hand (if the MSDB is located in lower bits), the comparison operation is relatively slow.
• BinSearch Method. The binary search method uses a modification of the CompareMC algorithm
that finds the MSDB more efficiently by using binary searching instead of sequential searching. Let
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Table 2: Performance comparison between range query methods
R Simple Method (sec) BinSearch Method (sec) Hybrid Method (sec)
28 11.50 4.79 2.46
216 8.19 4.84 1.73
224 5.90 4.89 1.27
228 4.55 4.89 1.10
232 3.48 4.82 0.87
CT = {Ci,0,Ci,1}i∈[n] be one ciphertext in a database D j and CT
′ = {C′i,0,C
′
i,1}i∈[n] be a ciphertext
created by a client with k. A server with a comparison key CK j,k = (K0,K1) first checks whether
e(Cn/2,0,K1) and e(C
′
n/2,0,K0) are equal or not. If the values are equal, it checks again whether
e(C3n/4,0,K1) and e(C
′
3n/4,0,K0) are equal since the MSDB is in the range [n/2+ 1,n]. On the other
hand, if the values are not equal, it checks whether e(Cn/4,0,K1) and e(C
′
n/4,0,K0) are equal since the
MSDB is in the range [1,n/2]. By repeating this process logn times, the server can find the MSDB.
Since the database contains at most M entries, it runs this modified comparison algorithm M times.
• Hybrid Method. The hybrid method uses the CompareMC algorithm and the Compare algorithm
together since the Compare algorithm is fast and it can compare the order of ciphertexts in a database
which are created by a single client. LetCTi be a ciphertext on a message mi in a database D j andCT
′
be a ciphertext on a message m′ given by a client in a range query. To answer the range query of the
client, a server should find a subset S of ciphertexts in D j such that mi <m
′. The server first compares
CT ′ with one specific CTi∗ ∈ D j by running the CompareMC algorithm, and then it divides all other
CTi ∈ D j into two groups L and R by running the Compare algorithm on input CTi and CTi∗ where L
contains ciphertexts of mi < mi∗ and R contains ciphertexts of mi∗ ≤ mi. If mi∗ < m
′, then the server
adds L to the subset S and repeats the above process by setting D j = R. If m
′ <mi∗ , the sever repeasts
the above process by setting D j = L.
We compared the performance of each method only for the basic MC-ORE scheme. For the comparison,
we set M = 100 and R ∈ {28,216,224,228,232}. We randomly selected 32-bit integers m1, · · · ,m100 and m
′
within a specific range [0,R], and then we encrypted m1, · · · ,m100 with SK andm
′ with SK′. The running time
of the above three range query methods is given in Table 2. The binary search method executes 12 pairing
operations per a single ciphertext comparison whereas the simple method performs executes at least 4 up to
66 pairing operations depending on the location of the MSDB. In other words, the binary search method is
better than the simple method if the data are within a small range and the high-order bits are equal, but it
is less efficient if the data are within a large range and the probability that the high-order bits are equal is
lower. The hybrid method is always more efficient than the simple method and the binary search method,
since some comparisons are performed by using the Compare algorithm instead of using the CompareMC
algorithm. That is, the performance of the hybrid method is far superior because theCompareMC algorithm
is performed for comparisons on the specific ciphertexts and the Compare algorithm is executed for the
remaining ciphertext comparisons.
It is important to improve the performance of the algorithm, but our results show that efficiency can
be improved in an appropriate way depending on the application environment. If our MC-ORE scheme is
applied to an environment other than a database range query, we can consider another way to improve its
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performance or its security.
6 Conclusion
We introduced the concept of multi-client order-revealing encryption (MC-ORE) that supports compar-
isons on ciphertexts generated by multiple clients as well as generated by one client. We also defined the
simulation-based security model for MC-ORE with respect to a leakage function. We then proposed two
practical MC-ORE schemes with different leakage functions and proved their security in the defined se-
curity model. The first scheme leaks more information, namely the most significant differing bit, and the
second scheme is the enhanced scheme with reduced leakage. We implemented our schemes to measure the
performance of each algorithm and provided additional range query methods to improve the performance in
a database range query.
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